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In November 2016, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump shockingly defied
most polling predictions and defeated Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton – just as
he had stunningly defeated a sea of GOP contenders in the months prior. On the campaign trail,
Trump’s promises were often vague, grandiose in scale, and terrifying to many minority groups:
an entire wall along the U.S.-Mexico border; a ban on Syrian and other refugees from entering
the country; and a repeal of ObamaCare. Since coming to power, Trump has attempted to initiate
many of these policies, but with little success. His initial travel ban was largely struck down,
there is no wall, and alternatives to ObamaCare have floundered in the Senate. And, with the
Democrats recently winning back the House of Representatives, most of his initiatives appear far
less likely to become enacted than ever before.
Trump has also continued to sow much confusion concerning what sort of foreign policy
approach he might take. During the campaign, much of his foreign policy rhetoric contradicted
itself. Trump criticized the U.S. for acting like “a bully” on the global stage and attempting to
police the world, such as by invading Iraq. Yet, he claimed he was going to create the biggest,
most financed military the world has ever seen. Trump criticized the Castro government in Cuba
and lambasted the Maduro government in Venezuela for promoting socialist economic policies
and ruling in an authoritarian manner. Yet, he praised a bevy of human rights violators, including
Russian President Vladimir Putin, among other authoritarian leaders located in places such as
Hungary, Kazakhstan, and the Philippines.
Now with Trump fully at the helm of the U.S. empire, there is much concern surrounding
the direction of U.S. foreign policy and how we might understand the foreign policy approach
taken by his administration. In this article, I make sense of American foreign policy under Trump
by placing his general approach into comparative-historical focus alongside the Bush II and
Obama administrations. I use Michael Mann’s (1986, 2005, 2012) IEMP model of power –
which centralizes a focus on ideological, economic, military, and political power – to examine
both the current administration’s foreign policy approach and the ramifications this approach
might have on the future of U.S. hegemony, that is, its capacity for global leadership.
Under the Bush II administration, Mann (2005) himself observed that the U.S. was
turning towards a new type of imperialism primarily based upon military power. He asserted that
the U.S. would continue to maintain significant economic power, but it would seek to exert
global domination primarily through military incursions. Despite U.S. military preponderance,
though, Mann (2005) argued that U.S. hegemony could not solely rest on military power,
particularly given that U.S. military forces were not omnipotent and had much difficulty
achieving, for example, basic military objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. Overall, Mann foresaw
ideological and political power diminishing under Bush II, especially as it pursued unilateral
military policies in the Middle East and North Africa. What is more, Mann (2005) deemed the
U.S. “an incoherent empire” that ultimately generated global chaos.
Indeed, as a result of the Global War on Terror that Bush II initiated, the U.S. incurred
much global disdain and generated rifts between the Americans and some traditional allies,
particularly France. Bush II’s contempt for multilateral institutions and treaties also irritated
many in the global community. And the fact that Bush II faced much difficulty in rallying the
international community, to begin with, illustrates some of the existing limits of U.S. hegemony.
Former President Obama worked to reverse the ideological and political damage the U.S.
suffered under Bush II. Obama sought to re-engage traditional allies and multilateral groups,
diminish the scope of the Global War on Terror in some important respects, and even reach out
to U.S. foes, including Cuba and Iran. Still, Obama escalated the use of drones to assassinate
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foreign and even domestic citizens, and engaged in warfare in Libya, without consulting
Congress or the United Nations. Despite this, global favorability ratings increased under his
tenure, and the U.S. repaired many of its damaged relationships, particularly throughout Europe.
Under the new administration, the U.S. has returned to a path more in line with Bush II.
Trump has condemned multilateral institutions, loudly sought to bolster the U.S. military, and
has maintained a fairly bellicose demeanor towards U.S. challengers, including some who in no
way represent an imminent threat, such as Venezuela. Yet, while some continuities persist,
Trump represents a significant break with Bush II and Obama. Trump not only promotes
unilateralism, but he has also elevated the ideas of anti-globalism and national sovereignty to the
fore. In doing so, he has begun to formally detach the U.S. from multilateral institutions, such as
the UN; he has reduced the role played by global aid and diplomacy; sparked a global trade war;
and jubilantly embraced a wide range of human rights violators and undemocratic regimes like
those that exist in Russia and Hungary. In the end, these changes bode ill for the future of U.S.
hegemony particularly at this historical juncture. China and Russia are actively seeking to
achieve their own influence throughout the world, both politically and economically, and, given
the U.S.’s isolationist position, they could conceivably displace the country in at least some
corners of the world. In the medium-term, U.S. military preponderance will surely continue, but
this alone cannot assure the U.S. a hegemonic position in the long-term.
U.S. Global Power
The U.S. achieved its status as a global superpower following the decimation wrought
across Western Europe during World War II. As former European powers had now become illequipped to produce enough goods to fulfill global and domestic demands, the U.S. became a
global leader in manufacturing and production. Indeed, following WWII, the U.S. generated
around 35 percent of global GDP. In addition, the U.S. established and controlled the Bretton
Woods financial system, which ultimately ensured the dominance of the U.S. dollar and
American-led capitalism. Through the Marshall Plan, the U.S. assisted Western Europe in its
reconstruction efforts and provided the country with enough capital to purchase U.S. products.
And in order to control the threat of communism, the U.S., particularly through the Central
Intelligence Agency, worked with Western European state security services to neutralize leftist
parties, beginning with electoral intervention in Greece and Italy shortly after WWII. Elsewhere,
such as in Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. directly or indirectly supported the forceful
dislocation of leftist governments and the arrival of right-wing, authoritarian regimes, such as the
government of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile.
These aforementioned dynamics characterize the post-World War II, mid-20th century
world, wherein the U.S. maintained an unequivocally dominant global position. At the turn of the
20th century, though, much has changed. The Cold War has ended, countries throughout Europe
have since re-industrialized, and new global actors have powerfully emerged alongside the U.S.,
namely China and Russia, who are each vying for global influence particularly within their
geographic regions of the world. This has led some authors to argue that U.S. global power is, in
the least, in relative decline, and perhaps soon facing total displacement (Boswell 2004;
Friedberg 2011; Go 2011; Hopewell 2016; Nye 2015; Wallerstein 2003).
Yet, there are next to no scholars that contend the U.S. is currently in a subservient global
position writ large. As a result of European reconstruction efforts, for example, the U.S. level of
global GDP has indeed diminished, but, in recent years, it has hovered around 24 percent – still
the world’s largest proportion (World Bank 2018). The U.S. dollar still effectively serves as the
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world’s reserve currency, and the U.S. also continues to possess military bases stationed all
throughout the world, including 800 by one recent estimate (Mann 2012; Nye 2015; Vine 2015).
In addition, the U.S. maintains the world’s largest military budget – nearly $700 billion; and it
maintains disproportionate influence within international financial institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (Babb 2009).
The country also wields much influence within domestic electoral contests throughout the world
by providing technical and financial assistance to like-minded political parties so that they might
outcompete competitors in electoral contests (Burron 2013; Gill 2018; Robinson 1996).
Despite all of these dynamics, though, the persistence of U.S. hegemony is no foregone
conclusion. Instead, U.S. state leaders must forge a careful global path that allows them to
maintain U.S. leadership capabilities. The U.S. must articulate ideas that resonate with
populations all throughout the world, facilitate the success of its economy and the corporations
headquartered therein, maintain working relations with other powerful global actors, and
eliminate or deter any serious military threats. This is difficult balance, and one that has been
mastered more successfully by some U.S. presidents than others. So where does Trump line up?
Assessing U.S. Global Power
Assessing U.S. global power involves an analysis of several dimensions – not just, for
example, military power. Michael Mann (1986, 2005, 2012) has utilized, what he has termed, an
IEMP conceptual framework to examine the multiple bases of power, as he understands them,
and to make sense of the relations between these bases of power. In this framework, IEMP refers
to ideology, economics, the military, and politics, and Mann argues that individuals aim to exert
influence through the command of at least one of these four bases. In his four volume-set titled
The Sources of Social Power, Mann assesses various crystallizations of power throughout time
and place. Through this framework, Mann has examined an array of historical events, including
European colonial efforts, the civil rights movements in the U.S., and the Great Recession of
2008 and its global consequences. What does Mann precisely mean, though, by each of the
IEMP sources of social power?
First, Mann (2012: 1) asserts that ideological power “derives from the human need to find
ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual
practices with others … [Ideologies] embody our hopes and fears.” We can apprehend the
ideological power of U.S. administrations by identifying those “norms and values” they promote
and how they seemingly resonate with the global community. Second, economic power involves
command over systems of production, exchange, and distribution of resources. We can extend
our understanding into the global world, and consider what countries, and the citizens and
corporations headquartered therein, dominate over systems global production, exchange, and
distribution. Some important indicators include global GDP, global currency reserves, and
leverage within international financial institutions. Third, military power involves command over
as the capacity for state-orchestrated violence, and, at the global level, we can look at sea, land,
and air capabilities, as well as budget allocations to get a sense of a country’s military might.
Finally, Mann (2012) understands political power as the authority that states and their leaders
wield over bounded territories. However, at the global level, we can understand political power
as the authority that states wield throughout the global system, and we can examine this by
looking at the leadership positions states wield in intergovernmental and multilateral bodies, the
allegiances that states possess, and their capacity to ensure that other states bend to their will.
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With the IEMP model, Mann (1986, 2012) has deliberately aimed to prioritize no one
particular dimension of power as necessarily determinative of any other dimension. As a result,
Mann is most closely, theoretically aligned with Max Weber. In his work, Weber primarily
sought to respond to the alleged economic determinism of Marxist theory and illustrate how
other dynamics shape social behavior and social outcomes, other than the economic motives of
the bourgeoisie and proletariat, and the conflict between them. In perhaps Weber’s most famous
work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber sought to show, for example,
how religiously-based ideas shaped the origins of capitalism in Western Europe. What is more,
Weber drew systematic attention to the existence of multiple bases of authority, including
rational-legal authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority. All taken together,
Weber sought to demonstrate how societal power and authority did not solely arise “at the point
of production.” Likewise, Mann too understands social power as rooted in an array of sources –
indeed the economy, but also having root in ideological, military, and political sources.
In order to make sense of the state of U.S. global power under the Trump administration,
this paper also utilizes the IEMP framework. In the end, I argue that while Trump is posed to
enhance U.S. military power and use this power on a more extensive global basis, he is
generating significant global declines with reference to ideological power, economic power, and
political power. While some of his policies extend the policies of other, recent presidential
administrations, particularly Bush II, but also Obama, his full-fledged emphasis on antiglobalism and national sovereignty, however, run contrary to them. Bush II seriously damaged
U.S. global influence, and Obama sought to repair this damage. The Trump administration,
however, has arisen at vastly different historical juncture, that is, one in which other global actors
are posed to capitalize on the global missteps of the U.S., namely China and Russia. The Trump
administration, therefore, poses a more immediate challenge to the future of U.S. hegemony, and
one that will become much more difficult to recover from under future administrations.
U.S. Global Power under Bush II and Obama
At the end of the Cold War, it appeared that the U.S. had finally conquered all formidable
challengers. In the immediate post-Cold War context, conflicts still ensued, such as in Bosnia
and Kosovo, but the U.S. seemed to dictate the direction of global affairs, often referred to as the
liberal international order (LIO). Some commentators even proclaimed the end of history, and a
new era for peace and democracy ushered in under the auspices of U.S. global hegemony. This
celebratory atmosphere, however, changed with the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September
11, 2001. Less than a year into the presidency of George W. Bush (Bush II), America appeared
more vulnerable than previously imagined. Much of the global community indeed sympathized
with the U.S., but Bush II’s handling of the aftermath, however, quickly spawned widespread
disdain for American foreign policy and its claims to global leadership.
How can we briefly understand the four bases of global power that underpinned the Bush
administration and its foreign policy pursuits? Although some members of the international
community supported the invasion of Afghanistan, Bush II’s unilateral military policies and
neoconservative political philosophy, which championed, among other measures, preemptive
military activity, drone warfare, and enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), irritated many
more members. Bush II’s unilateral policy was not entirely out of ideological lockstep with
previous administrations, but his championing of preemptive military strikes, whereby the U.S.
might attack countries and groups before they actually perpetrated attacks against the country
appeared as a terrifying justification for nearly any sort of military foray. And despite
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widespread global criticism, Bush II appeared uninterested in global public opinion. For his
administration, the U.S. would not hesitate to transgress international law and global consensus
concerning how conflicts should be addressed, even if this included declaring an indefinite,
global war involving little oversight.
These dynamics undoubtedly damaged U.S. ideological and political power. Bush II
experienced dismal global confidence ratings with the advance of his term in office. For instance,
the Pew Research Center reported the following ratings for Bush by 2008: 16% in the UK, 14%
in Germany, and 13% in France. In 2001, though, Bush had possessed considerably higher
ratings – 30% in the UK, 51% in Germany, and 20% in France. What is more, Bush II was
openly rebuked by many historical U.S. allies, including government leaders in Canada, France,
and Germany, who refused to participate in the invasion of Iraq and denounced these U.S.
efforts. And so, amid much global sympathy for the U.S. and an opportunity to curry global
support for a U.S. response, Bush II turned much of the world against him and his policies.
Yet, while Bush II damaged the ideological and political standing of the U.S. by
championing ideas and pursuing policies out of touch with the rest of the world, U.S. military
preponderance and economic dominance persisted. The U.S. continued to maintain the largest
military budget, and no other country maintained anything close to the amount of overseas
military bases (Vine 2015). The U.S. portion of global GDP dwarfed all closest competitors, and,
by any other estimation, U.S. economic dominance continued apace: the highest amount of
foreign direct investment, housing a disproportionate amount of the most financially successful
corporations, and retaining the highest level of purchasing power parity, one indicator that would
diminish in later years.
After coming to power, Obama sought to reverse some of the ideological and political
pursuits of Bush II. Obama, for example, reined in on the use of EITs and paid no lip service to
the idea of preemptive military strikes, but his administration indeed conducted more drone
strikes than the previous, and he still prioritized unilateral military measures, as embodied by his
administration’s decision to unseat Libyan autocrat Muammar Gaddafi without consulting the
UN or Congress. Yet, Obama often spoke the language of multilateralism; sought to open some
relations up with former foes, namely Cuba and Iran; and pursued global economic integration,
as typified by the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He also presented himself as someone willing to
listen to allies and to engage with audiences around the world, rather than acting based on his
own intuition.
Seemingly as a result of his more intensive engagement with the broader world, Obama
received very high favorability ratings throughout the world, especially in comparison with Bush
II. The Pew Research Center has reported that throughout the world Obama maintained a 64%
confidence rating by the end of his presidency. And in many countries, this rating was much
higher: 79% in the UK, 84% in France, 86% in Germany, and 93% in Sweden. In addition, as
with Bush II, U.S. economic and military preponderance generally continued, with one caveat.
Under Obama, both China and Russia began to actively pursue a more significant role in the
world. China initiated its One Belt, One Road policy in order to economically link up with
countries all throughout the world and finance development projects, and Russia began to once
again to become a primary supplier of military weapons to countries throughout the world. Both
countries moved into their current roles, too, as global aid providers to countries both within and
beyond their traditional spheres of influence to include countries in, for example, Africa and
Latin America. Nonetheless, the U.S. remained the world’s largest aid provider and many
countries’ primary trading partner.
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So, what has changed, if anything, under Trump in regards to the projection of U.S.
global power, and is there anything distinctive about his presidency in comparison with Bush II
and Obama?
Analyzing Global Power under Trump Administration
Ideological Power under the Trump Administration
Above any other idea or value, President Trump has championed “America First.” Trump
has promised to protect the country from terrorists and undocumented immigrants by securing
the borders and placing strict limitations on immigration policy. At the global level though, what
does Trump does presumably mean when he embraces “America First”? Trump’s “America
First” policy involves an embrace of national sovereignty. For instance, during his UN General
Assembly Speech in September 2017, Trump mentioned the words “sovereign” or “sovereignty”
21 times, and, in 2018, he mentioned these words 12 times. Indeed, towards the beginning of his
2017 speech, Trump clearly articulated his vision of American foreign policy, stating
“In foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of sovereignty. Our
government's first duty is to its people, to our citizens -- to serve their needs, to ensure
their safety, to preserve their rights, and to defend their values. As President of the United
States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will
always, and should always, put your countries first.”
In this statement, Trump clearly asserts the primacy of U.S. citizens, and that, even in foreign
affairs, Trump will remain concerned with the “needs, safety, rights, and values” of the U.S. This
disposition coheres quite consistently with his domestic nationalist policies that have prioritized
ethnic chauvinism.
Under Trump’s sovereignty doctrine, he seemingly welcomes foreign governments as
they exist. And, in doing so, Trump suggests that he will not condemn foreign governments’
human rights violations, but will work with an array of state leaders, regardless of their styles of
domestic governance. Since coming to power, Trump has, in fact, praised several authoritarian
leaders widely recognized for their human rights violations, including, for instance, Vladimir
Putin in Russia, Rodrigo Duterte in the Phillipines, and Victor Orbán in Hungary. He has even
went so far as to cast doubt on CIA findings regarding Russian intervention into the 2016
election and the Saudi-government linked murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
On the other hand, though, Trump has loudly criticized several leftist, authoritarian
leaders, including Raul Castro in Cuba and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, evidencing an obvious
double standard, which, of course, predates Trump, but was most intense during the height of the
Cold War. What is more, Trump has sought to roll-back the advances Obama made involving
U.S.-Cuba relations, and he has repeatedly called democratically-elected Venezuelan President
Maduro “a dictator,” stating that a U.S. “military option” exists to violently remove him from
power. All of this is to say that while Trump rhetorically embraces sovereignty, he appears to
respect the national sovereignty of some countries, but not others, and, in doing so, remains
entirely willing to embrace human rights violators and undemocratic regimes. Indeed, these
dynamics predate the Trump administration, but no other recent president has explicitly
embraced authoritarian, undemocratic rulers with such exhilaration as Trump.
While Trump vocally embraces these ideas, though, they resonate very little throughout
the world, ultimately illustrating what amounts to a serious decline in U.S. ideological power.
The Pew Research Center, for instance, has reported that since Trump took office global
confidence in the U.S. president diminished from 64% to 22% (Pew Research Center 2017).
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Most countries Pew surveyed evidenced double digit declines. Sweden, for instance, evidenced a
reduction of 83 percentage points from 93% to 10% confidence in the U.S. president, and both
the Netherlands and Germany exhibited a reduction of 75 percentage points. Only two countries
have witnessed an increase in confidence in the U.S. president: Israel (from 49% to 56%) and
Russia (from 11% to 53%). Throughout 37 countries surveyed, Pew found that citizens across
the world have more confidence in Angela Merkel (42%), Xi Jinping (28%), and Vladimir Putin
(27%) than they do in Trump (22%).
Perhaps even more startling is how many countries now consider U.S. power and
influence a threat to their country. Since Trump took office, a majority of the population in
countries all throughout the world now find the U.S. a threat, including Chile (57%), Japan
(62%), Lebanon (50%), Mexico (61%), Spain (59%), and Turkey (72%), among several others
(Pew Research Center 2017). In addition, Pew research has shown that global favorability ratings
of the U.S., generally speaking, have diminished from 64% to 49%, as many citizens around the
world continue to somewhat separate countries from their leaders. Nonetheless, Pew’s findings
paint a very bleak picture for the prospects of U.S. ideological power under Trump.
Beyond the expression of values, Trump has cut funding for many institutions that
contribute to what Joseph Nye (2004) has termed U.S. soft power – or a state’s ability to
persuade other states to follow its leadership without using force. This ability derives from
cultural allure, and the norms and values societies allegedly champion. Much U.S. soft power
emanates from the provision of global aid, as well as from global attraction to U.S. institutions,
such as American universities and research development centers. Yet, Trump has sought to
intentionally curb the allure of the U.S. so much so that U.S. universities are, for a second year in
a row, witnessing declines in international enrollment. What is more, Trump has continually
called for reductions in spending on the diplomatic services of the State Department and on U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) programs. As a result, many State Department
positions that were filled under Obama continue to remain empty, including the Under Secretary
for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.
These reductions limit the influence that the U.S. might wield abroad. USAID programs,
for instance, historically have supported non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights
groups, English language programs, and cultural exchanges, in addition to economic
development programs. These programs are not without criticism, especially concerning the
political-economic disposition of the groups that often receive funding (Burron 2013; Robinson
1996). Nonetheless, though, Trump’s actions will undeniably reduce U.S. influence abroad.
Indeed, in those countries that receive higher amounts of U.S. aid, the U.S. also witnesses far
higher favorability ratings. And, more importantly, in those countries that possess higher
favorability towards the U.S., we see, for example, an increased probability of voting alignment
within the UN, as well foreign troop commitments to U.S.-led military pursuits (Datta 2009;
Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012). In other words, we find higher levels of leadership capabilities.
As the U.S. plans to cut back its support for international aid programs, both China and
Russia have increasingly come to play a more prominent, international role in the provision of
global aid, particularly in Africa and Latin America. Both countries, for instance, have
economically assisted the Venezuelan government since former President Hugo Chávez came to
power, a fervent critic of U.S. foreign policy. Since 2005, the Chinese government has provided
Venezuela with over $60 billion in loans (Smilde and Gill 2013). And, amid its gripping
economic crisis, the Chinese and Russian governments have renegotiated existing loans with
current Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and continued to provide additional capital so that
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Venezuela might pay international bondholders, lest they claim Venezuelan foreign assets. The
Venezuelan government has even pledged its U.S.-based subsidiary Citgo to Russia as collateral,
should it fail to make future payments. The two countries have continued to conduct military
exercises together, and Russia has continued to supply the Venezuelan government with an array
of military weapons, including tanks and Sukhoi fighter jets (Smilde and Gill 2013).
In both Africa and Latin America, China has increasingly sunk billions of dollars’ worth
of funding into raw materials alongside the construction of development projects: dams, roads,
bridges, housing. Chinese state companies have invested in mines in DR Congo and Guinea, as
well as oil and gas in Angola and Guinea (Chen, Dollar, and Tang 2015). In addition, the
Chinese government has financed the construction of dams in several African countries,
including DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Sudan. As a result of Chinese economic efforts in
Africa and elsewhere over the past decade, it is little surprise that the Pew Research Center
(2017) has found that out of 37 countries surveyed, a majority in only four countries view
Chinese power and influence as a threat: Japan, South Korea, Spain, and Vietnam. This is, once
again, in comparison with nine countries that now view the U.S. as a threat.
Given the lack of confidence in Trump and his “America First” policy and given his
deliberate attempts to undermine U.S. soft power, U.S. ideological power bodes to clearly suffer
under his rule. And although Russia appears as one location where citizens have applauded his
rise to power, both China and Russia remain more than willing to cultivate support in locations
throughout the world where the U.S. has long considered itself the hegemonic power. In Latin
America, for instance, Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Russian trade and investment is beginning
to equal and, in some instances, outpace U.S. efforts. China, for instance, has now become
Brazil’s largest trading partner. In addition, both China and Russia continue to work closely with
governments that retain anti-American sentiments, particularly Cuba and Venezuela, but also
Bolivia and Nicaragua. More than a few Latin American governments remain undeniably closer
with the Chinese and Russian governments than ever before, and they now appear more
concerned with how these two powers view their policies and governance than they do the U.S.
Economic Power under the Trump Administration
There is no doubt that the U.S. continues to wield an inordinate amount of economic
power and influence at the global level. The U.S. dollar, for instance, continues to comprise a
clear majority (64%) of all allocated foreign exchange reserves throughout the world (IMF
2017). The dollar also remains the most traded currency and even operates as the de facto
currency in nations beyond its borders, including Ecuador and Zimbabwe. U.S. government
bonds remain the world’s most sought after, and the U.S. stock market remains the largest in the
world. The U.S. also continues to wield considerable influence within international financial
institutions, like the IMF, and, despite some earlier concerns, Trump plans to continue to heavily
fund these organizations (Babb 2009). Perhaps most importantly, though, the U.S. continues to
generate the world’s largest amount of global GDP: $18 trillion. And yet, despite all of these
features, serious questions regarding the future of U.S. economic power under Trump persist,
namely as it involves his orchestration of a global trade war with China.
Interdependence largely characterizes relations between the U.S. and Chinese economies.
U.S. consumers and U.S.-headquartered corporations rely upon Chinese manufacturing and labor
for cheap products, and Chinese manufacturers and workers rely upon the U.S. market to sell
those products. Scholars continue to debate, though, if/when China will overtake the U.S. along a
range of economic indicators. China has, in fact, already surpassed the U.S. in one measure:
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purchasing power parity (ppp). In 2014, while the U.S. possessed 16.28% of the world’s ppp,
China reported 16.48% ppp – and, since this time, this ranking has persisted (Business Insider
10/08/2014). In terms of the production of global GDP – perhaps the most important economic
indicator of all, China continues to lag fairly far behind the U.S. with $11.2 trillion, compared
with the U.S.’s $18 trillion. In addition, the Chinese renminbi comprises only 10% of foreign
reserves held throughout the world – behind also the Australian and Canadian dollars, as well as
the Euro, Japanese yen, and British pound (IMF 2017).
One area in which the U.S. is posed to lose economic power, however, derives from the
manner in which Trump has attacked free trade. One of Trump’s first acts after coming power
included his decision to withdraw from the TPP agreement, which included eleven other
countries. Aside from closer economic integration, the agreement was expected to diminish
Chinese economic power throughout Asia, particularly in Vietnam. With the U.S. withdrawal,
however, this has allowed China to intensify its One Belt, One Road Initiative, which has
involved closer economic integration with countries all throughout the world. In the section
above, we see just how intensively China is attempting to make inroads into places like Africa
and Latin America, by sponsoring development projects alongside its acquisition of natural
resources. In doing so, many individuals fear that without the moderating influence of an actor
like the U.S., many foreign governments will increasingly rely upon the Chinese government for
aid and development projects, which are devoid of the political strings that U.S. aid often
involves, such as greater demands for democracy (Naím 2009; Risse and Babayan 2015). As a
result, some have labeled China’s approach as involving autocracy, rather than democracy,
promotion, and they fear that any political-economic vacuum, such as the folding of the TPP,
will be filled by China.
For his part, Trump initially backed away from irritating China. Throughout his
campaign, Trump recurrently talked tough on China. However, after coming to power, Trump
reneged on his campaign promise to label China a currency manipulator, failed to even lightly
criticize Chinese human rights violations on his visit to the country, and ousted Steve Bannon,
his administration’s loudest critic of China. Trump not only reverse course once though, but
twice. While it initially appeared he was cozying up to China, he has recently begun to wage a
trade war against the country, from which the Chinese do not appear willing to back down.
Throughout 2018, Trump levied $250 billion in tariffs against Chinese imports, and, in response,
China has set tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. imports. Trump has even promised to impose
tariffs on all remaining amount of Chinese tariffs if China does not comply with Trump
administration demands, which include an end to alleged intellectual property theft.
Although the U.S. economy continues to experience growth, a trend that has continued
since the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, there are signs that the U.S. economy will
face serious problems in the near future, not least of which due to Trump’s trade war with China.
U.S. consumers remain heavily reliant upon Chinese imports, and U.S. tariffs only bode to raise
the cost of consumer products in stores throughout the country, such as Walmart and Target.
Should these efforts result in less consumption, U.S. jobs will also suffer. What is more, China is
already beginning to diversify its supply chains by, for example, cutting its supply of soybeans
from the U.S. and initiating record-breaking trade with Brazil. And for their part, U.S. farmers
are now relying upon billions of dollars’ worth of U.S. subsidies as their crops rot in storage.
It is rather difficult to understand who Trump is precisely aiming to help with his trade
war. His protectionist policies are out of lockstep with the needs of both U.S. consumers and the
world. He has claimed that he would like to bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S., but there
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is no indication that this is a serious possibility. In fact, some producers like Harley-Davidson
have even made plans to relocate production elsewhere in order to service overseas consumers,
given that Trump tariffs have also hit steel and aluminum imports from much of the rest of the
world. In the end, then, economic policies under Trump resemble nothing like the approach
taken by the Bush II and Obama administrations, which both aggressively pursued trade
initiatives within and beyond the hemisphere. Bush II indeed imposed short-term steel tariffs, but
a widespread trade war with China and other countries never came upon the agenda. If Trump
policies return more well-paying jobs to the country than not, he will be surely praised, but this
possibility seemingly has no serious support beyond the administration itself, and its
implementation is puzzling.
Military Power under the Trump Administration
Under Trump, there is no doubt that the U.S. will continue to maintain military
dominance throughout the world. Trump, for example, has increased the Defense budget to
nearly $700 billion, as he intends to update machinery and employ more military members to
defend the country. And, unlike any other former superpower, the U.S. commands preponderant
military forces on air, land, and water. In addition, the U.S. maintains around 800 military bases
(Nye 2015; Vine 2015). Yet, despite the continuation of a clear preponderance of military force,
some caveats are in order concerning U.S. military power under the Trump administration.
Although Trump ultimately backtracked on his criticisms of NATO, it is important to
note that he initially doubted the relevance of this organization. According to Trump, NATO
involved a largely obsolete, unnecessary, and needlessly cost-inefficient arrangement. Many
individuals on the both right and left agree with scrapping NATO. Given increased Russian
aggression in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, other scholars, however, have pointed out
that scrapping NATO in the contemporary period would be a mistake. More than any other
organization, the Russian government loathes the presence of NATO and its ability to combat its
militaristic efforts in the region. In the end, Trump has apparently come to terms with the
existence and importance of the international organization, albeit he has couched its relevance in
terms of containing undocumented immigrants and refugees throughout Europe.
Although on the campaign trail Trump often criticized the U.S. as “a bully,” lamented
U.S. involvement in the War in Iraq, and seemed to suggest that he would scale back U.S.
foreign policy efforts. Trump has acted in a highly aggressive manner since coming to office.
Trump has intensified efforts in Afghanistan – including an increase in both the use of troops and
the use of bombs. In fact, in September 2017 alone, the U.S. dropped over 700 bombs throughout
Afghanistan – the largest amount in seven years. Trump also shot Tomahawk missiles at Syrian
government sites in a show of force towards the Assad regime. And, perhaps most shockingly,
Trump has threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea, a country that possesses nuclear
weapons, and he has threatened the Maduro government in Venezuela with “a military option” if
it does not acquiesce to his demands. Trump has thus clearly went back on his earlier vision of
reigning in U.S. foreign aggression.
Trump does not appear all that different than any other GOP politician on many military
issues. We could have surely expected another Republican president to have ramped up military
spending, and aggressively combated Syria. We could have also expected some tough talking on
North Korea and Venezuela. However, openly considering military intervention, particularly into
a country that possesses nuclear capabilities, is beyond what any other serious American
politician would articulate. Obama, for his part, reined in on enhanced interrogation techniques,

https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol13/iss1/11

10

Gill: Diminishing Global Power, Downgrading Human Rights

but he still deployed U.S. military force, particularly in the form of drone warfare, and most
notably against Libya. Where Trump diverges from other recent presidents is in his intensified
rhetoric. However, he does not diverge very much from the national executive line of
strengthening and relying upon U.S. military force to pursue some semblance of global order.
Political Power under the Trump Administration
Similar to ideological power, U.S. political power also bodes to suffer major setbacks
under the Trump administration, particularly as a result of its rejection of human rights norms, its
bellicose posturing, and its cheerful embrace of authoritarian leaders. Trump and his aggressive
verbiage have sparked diplomatic rows with a number of countries, and his militaristic
disposition towards a number of countries throughout the world has already threatened to derail
multilateral efforts to achieve peace in a number of locations, namely North Korea, Iran, and
Venezuela. Trump himself has evidenced antipathy towards a number of multilateral institutions
and multilateral initiatives, including the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and
the Paris Agreement. As a result, many world leaders are coming to disdain Trump’s behavior
and, unsurprisingly, have sought to further distance themselves from him. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, then, most of the world leaders that have actually shown some warmth towards
President Trump include only those leaders that rule in a generally authoritarian and human
rights-violating manner: the Saudis, Russian President Putin, Filipino President Duterte,
Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán. In turn, Trump has demonstrated warmth towards them,
illustrating what little regard the administration has for promoting human rights abroad.
As several countries have promoted dialogue and negotiation concerning crises in a
multiplicity of locations, Trump has been more apt to engage in chest-beating much to the
dismay of world leaders that have consistently worked towards peace. This is evident in a variety
of places, including North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela. On several occasions, Trump has alluded
to potentially using force against the North Korean government. He has suggested that North
Korean leadership will only listen to force and, during his UN speech, Trump asserted that the
U.S. will “totally destroy” North Korea if necessary. These threats have deeply concerned nearby
countries, including China, Japan, and South Korea, who have worked towards diplomatic
solutions to crises involving North Korea. There is no doubt that grave human rights abuses
persist in North Korea; however, surrounding countries recognize that the government possesses
nuclear power capabilities, and they are loathe to bait North Korean leadership into potentially
utilizing them.
In Latin America, as well, several countries have been working diligently to bring the
Venezuelan opposition and the Venezuelan government to the negotiating table in order to
extract concessions particularly from the government. In the last several years, Venezuela has
experienced a deep economic crisis, and the Maduro government has increasingly engaged in
authoritarian behavior by sidelining its national legislature and, in some instances, arbitrarily
arresting members of the opposition. Despite protests against Maduro and calls for him to resign,
he has dug his heels into the presidency. In response, Trump has continually announced that “a
military option” exists to take out Maduro, and Trump and his foreign policy team, namely
National Security Advisor John Bolton, have pushed for all-out regime change by supporting
opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the country’s interim president. These efforts have fueled
intensified nationalistic fervor within Venezuela, leading Maduro to claim that an imperial effort
exists to undermine his government. In the end, dialogue between the government and opposition
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has generally broken down with only small glimmers of hope, and the government has remained
recalcitrant, leading to a current standoff, wherein poor Venezuelans are most posed to suffer.
At the global level, Trump has shown antipathy for international institutions that receive
support from most countries throughout the world, many of which champion human rights
norms. During the campaign, Trump recurrently criticized the UN and promoted a pro-national
sovereignty, anti-multilateral position, and he threatened to de-fund the organization. In addition,
Trump has sought to undermine the UN’s most prominent, recent accomplishment: the Paris
Agreement. Under this agreement, countries around the world have agreed to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and take additional measures to combat global warming. In June 2017, though,
Trump announced that the U.S. would begin the four-year process of withdrawal from the
agreement, which would complete in 2020. Foremost among his reasons, Trump asserted that
trillions of dollars and millions of jobs would be lost as a result of adherence to the agreement
(BBC 06/01/2017). Trump additionally stated that the U.S. would also withdraw from UNESCO
which promotes international integration and commemorates world heritage sites. Trump has
claimed that the group displays an anti-Israel bias, due to its recognition of Palestine, and, given
existing $550 million of existing arrears, Trump chose to withdraw from the body (New York
Times 10/12/2017).
In addition to the UN, Trump has shown contempt for the OAS, the Western
Hemisphere’s most prominent multilateral group, and its associated entities, particularly the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). During March 2017, the Trump
administration failed to appear before the IACHR for hearings related to Trump’s proposed
immigration policies (Reuters 03/21/2017). This act further illustrated Trump’s commitment to
national sovereignty over and above the promotion of global human rights norms. Indeed, the
only two other countries that regularly make a habit of denouncing the OAS include Cuba and
Venezuela, two countries the Trump Administration currently remains at odds with.
While Trump has criticized Cuban and Venezuelan leadership, however, for democratic
and human rights shortcomings, Trump has lavished praise upon right-wing, authoritarian
leaders elsewhere. He invited Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán to the White House for a visit,
despite the aggression that Orbán has directed towards NGOs, human rights groups, and
journalists. What is more, Trump welcomed Thailand’s military junta leader, Prime Minister
Prayuth Chan-ocha, to the White House, in addition to members from the authoritarian Turkish
government. The Thai leader initially came to power through a military coup and has
subsequently ruled the country in a repressive manner. And, finally, Trump has continually
displayed warmth towards Russian President Putin – referring to him as a strong leader,
suggesting that the U.S. and Russia develop closer relations, and downplaying Putin’s murderous
regime. In an interview with a newscaster over the 2017 Super Bowl Weekend, for instance,
Trump told the newscaster that he respected Putin and, when the newscaster stated that Putin was
a killer, Trump minimized these accusations and responded by saying “We’ve got a lot of killers.
What, do you think our country’s so innocent?” (The Guardian 02/06/2017).
Finally, while Trump has reached out to authoritarian leaders and denigrated multilateral
institutions, Trump has hindered the work of his own state apparatus. Until the present, the
Department of State, that is, the U.S. state agency charged with carrying out the day-to-day work
of U.S. foreign policy, remains grossly understaffed, including vacant ambassadorships. Perhaps
most startling of all, Trump actually praised Putin for ordering 755 U.S. foreign service officers
out of Russia, saying that he wanted “to thank him because we’re trying to cut down on payroll,
and as far as I’m concerned, I’m very thankful that he let go of a large number of people,
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because now we have a smaller payroll” (New York Times 08/10/2017). Indeed, Trump seems
vastly unconcerned with the lack of U.S. personnel stationed throughout the world, and this lack
of concern, perhaps more than anything else, illustrates how intensively Trump wishes to scale
back diplomatic efforts. Without these members of the foreign service stationed abroad, it is
quite difficult to even begin to consider any sort of effective U.S. diplomacy.
Conclusion
Perhaps more than any other dimension of U.S. power, ideological power promises to
diminish as Trump’s “America First” policy has little to offer the world. Indeed, many countries
rely upon U.S. foreign aid for a large portion of their GDP, and many citizens around the world
are eager for more U.S. cultural exchange. Trump, however, has enthusiastically championed
national sovereignty over and above the promotion of global human rights. While he has
selectively criticized left-wing authoritarian leaders, such as in Venezuela, he has lavished rightwing authoritarian leaders with praise. In addition, Trump has generally shunned multilateral
institutions that much of the world have come to embrace, including the UN and the OAS, as
well as those U.S. institutions that allow the U.S. to exercise much of its soft power, including
foreign aid programs, such as those operated by USAID.
Nowhere is the global repudiation of the Trump Administration and its policies more
evident than in global public polling that illustrates the startlingly low levels of confidence that
global citizens have in Trump. The election of Trump has puzzled many around the world, and
his actions have continued to do so. Trump has implicitly, if not explicitly, catered to the
interests of white supremacists, and he has even been quite slow to castigate his neo-Nazi and
Klan supporters. Only two countries have seemingly welcomed the election of Trump: Russia
and Israel. Elsewhere, the world has continued to cringe at the president’s antics.
The ideological vacuum that the U.S. portends to leave open as a result of Trump’s
policies might very well become filled by China. In the last several years, China has begun to
provide a number of loans to countries all throughout the Global South, and it has embarked
upon a number of development projects, particularly in Africa and Latin America. To a lesser
extent, Russia has made inroads throughout Latin America and appears quite willing to curry
favor throughout the Western Hemisphere. On the economic front, too, the Chinese government
seems all the more interested in furthering its One Belt, One Road economic policies by pouring
funds into Africa and Latin America, among other locations. The U.S. dollar will surely continue
to reign supreme, and U.S. stocks and bonds will continue to trade at feverish rates. Through its
development policies, though, the Chinese government will continue to provide an alternative to
U.S. foreign aid, and, in doing so, the Chinese will harden the anti-American positions that many
governments have taken over the last several decades.
At the level of global politics, Trump has irritated many leaders, from neighbors in
Mexico and Canada, to those in Australia and Germany. Much to the detriment of many in the
global community, Trump has exacerbated tensions between the U.S. and North Korea, as well
as between the U.S. and Venezuela. Trump’s actions threaten to derail efforts towards diplomacy
and peace that many world leaders have worked towards for several months, if not years, in their
respective regions of the world. More than anything, then, the Trump administration has already
proved a bane to global peace efforts. This is no more evident than in the bellicose posturing that
Trump himself has engaged in. He has, at times, overtly threatened both the North Korean and
Venezuelan governments with military action, leading to alarm in both countries.
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There is no doubt that U.S. military preponderance will continue, as Trump has solidified
a nearly $700 billion Defense budget. The U.S. will continue to command preponderance on
land, sea, and air, and this will, of course, limit the actions of many countries throughout the
world. Nonetheless, many leaders recognize that despite U.S. preponderance, the U.S. does not
remain invincible. Communism, of course in name, still persists in China, Cuba, Laos, North
Korea, and Vietnam, and challenging governments continue to maintain power in place such as
Belarus, Nicaragua, Russia, and Venezuela. U.S. military power thus cannot contain all
challengers, and the U.S. will need to rely upon political and diplomatic strategies if it wishes to
cultivate a more cooperative global environment. What is more, Trump has threatened peace
efforts throughout the world and even exacerbated existing tensions, such as in North Korea,
Iran, and Venezuela. If anything, these escalations threaten both global and national citizens,
and, given North Korean nuclear capabilities, even risk total annihilation.
Whether Trump lasts a full eight years in the presidency or undergoes successful
impeachment proceedings, ramifications will persist for years to come. Following Bush II,
Obama made systematic efforts to restore confidence in the U.S. by traveling extensively across
the globe. During the 2008 election, Senator John McCain lambasted Obama for these efforts. In
the end though, they worked, as the U.S. regained much of its clout. Of course, not all world
leaders and global citizens were taken with Obama, but his appeal was much more wide-ranging
than both Bush II and Donald Trump. This appeal is not without benefits. Obama negotiated with
Iran, initiated diplomatic relations with Cuba, and sought to economically integrate several
countries through the TPP agreements. Like Obama, Trump’s behavior will also surely have
ramifications. Primarily, this will involve the gulf created by the U.S. amid its retreat from
multilateralism and the global community. Bush II also retreated in part from the global
community; however, no other country possessed the ability to displace U.S. leadership. In
contrast, at the current historical juncture, we see China and, to a lesser extent, Russia actively
pursuing the cultivation of global influence. Obama had the opportunity to bolster U.S.
hegemony; Trump, however, is taking the opportunity to dismantle it and, with the rise of other
countries, in a much more extensive and potentially long-lasting manner than Bush II.
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